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Abstract
We show that whatever the representation of criminals’ preferences un-
der risk, the assumption according to which they are strongly risk averse
individuals is not consistent with the available observations establishing
that criminals are more sensitive to shifts in the probability of sanction
than to changes in the level of the sanction. We suggest that: 1/ while a
weakening of the risk aversion assumption may be useful, the risk seeking
assumption may be better suited for criminals; 2/ the relevant assumption
regarding criminals’ risk attitude may depend on the policy instruments
that models of crime deterrence take into account; 3/ additional exper-
iments, including both monetary penalties and non monetary sanctions
would be useful in order to learn more about their sensibility to probabil-
ity, monetary and non monetary sanctions.
Keywords: Risk aversion; monetary and non monetary sanctions; State De-
pendent preferences and RDEU models.
JEL Classification: D81, K42.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we address the issue of the risk sensitivity of criminals. We
challenge the view of Nielson and Winter (1997) who discuss the specific as-
sumptions about criminals’ preferences that would enable us to rationalize the
experimental evidence afforded by Block and Gerety (1995) and Grogger (1991)
(see hereafter). We show that the solution provided by Nielson and Winter in
fact focus on a particular concept of risk aversion which is associated with char-
acterizations (e.g. formal restrictions) that appear as quite questionable from
the empirical point of view. We suggest that additional experiments, including
more specifically both monetary penalties and non monetary sanctions, would
be useful to take into account some neglected aspects concerning the issue of
the risk attitude of criminals. Moreover, we point out that the results of these
∗I would like to thank Jenny Monheim for her assistance. All remaining errors are mine.
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experiments would have important consequences to shed some light on a long-
standing controversy initiated by Becker (1968), regarding the design of socially
efficient policies of law enforcement.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we briefly review
basic results and definitions about the concept of risk aversion. In section 3,
we first show that the findings of Block and Gerety (1995) and Grogger (1991)
rule out the Rothschild-Stiglitz risk aversion assumption in the strong sense
for any model of criminals’ preferences. In contrast, risk seeking in the strong
sense fits well with the data. In section 3, we show that the SDU approach can
allow us to reconcile the weaker risk aversion assumption of Arrow-Pratt with
the observations only if we introduce an additional assumption on the marginal
utility of wealth, which is not implied by risk aversion per se. Moreover, this
last assumption may be not easily justified, specifically when we consider that
state dependence captures the effects of non monetary sanctions. In this vein,
it appears that criminals’ risk attitudes may be the result of public enforcement
of the law. Section 4 concludes. We suggest that some additional and more
specific experiments are required in order to learn more about criminals’ risk
attitudes and particularly to learn more about their sensitivity to punishment
and detection. We point out that the results of such experiments are of impor-
tance in economics of crime, since they are connected to empirical assessments
of the trade-off between probability, fines and non monetary sanctions.
2 Risk aversion
The assumption about people’s risk attitudes and preferences are an ongoing
discussion in the L&E literature 1 and given that the debate is not different
from the controversies in decision theory and Economics in general, it is worth
to recalling some of the most well established results. Risk aversion is a usual be-
havioral assumption in economics as a basic motivation explaining the existence
of market exchanges such as in insurance or financial markets. Nevertheless,
both theoretical works and accumulated experimental evidence in the area of
decision theory and economics of risk show first that the concept of risk aversion
is by no means a commonplace concept, and second that the Expected Utility
model which is the framework of textbook economics is the least relevant rep-
resentation of individual preferences.
On the one hand, there exist several alternative intrinsic definitions of this
behavioral assumption (see Cohen (1995) for a survey). By “intrinsic”, we mean
that each definition is designed to capture a specific behavioral concept, inde-
pendently of any particular representation of individual’s preferences under risk
that could be used for practical purposes. For example, the two well known
1Polinsky and Shavell (1979) and Nielson (1998) study the implications of criminals’ risk
aversion for the enforcement of law. More recently in tort law, several papers by Bigus (2006),
Eide (2005), Nell and Richter (2003), Teitelbaum (2006) or Zivin, Just and Zilberman (2006)
use different approaches to study the functioning of liability rules when both offenders and
victims are risk averse individuals.
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definitions suggested by Arrow-Pratt2 and by Rothschild-Stiglitz3 , are from a
basic conceptual point of view two different concepts of risk aversion. As a result
turning to the issue of characterizing risk aversion in the context of a specific
axiomatically-based model allowing the representation of individual preferences,
it is now well known for example that these two concepts of risk aversion re-
quire a distinguishable set of restrictions (see Cohen (1995)) unless we confine
ourselves to the Expected Utility model where they are both equivalent to the
concavity of the utility index of the decision maker.
On the other hand, there is well documented experimental evidence showing
that attitude towards risk is a complex story in practise, in the sense that
the typical pattern of risk attitudes is fourfold: individuals are prone to a risk
seeking attitude either with small probabilities of gains or large probabilities of
losses; in contrast risk aversion occurs either for small probabilities of losses or
large probabilities of gains (see Tversky and Wakker (1995)). This implies that
any given individual displays both risk aversion and risk seeking for a wide range
of payoffs, depending on the probabilities to which these payoffs are associated
in the prospects he is facing. It is also now well established that this pattern of
behavior is not consistent with the Expected Utility (EU thereafter) assumption.
Experiments performed in the area of crime deterrence have come to simi-
lar conclusions. Block and Gerety (1995) and Grogger (1991) have shown that
criminals exhibit more sensitivity to shifts in the probability of fine than to
changes in the fine. Although this not a direct test about whether criminals
are risk averse individuals or not, such a finding is not consistent with the joint
assumption that criminals are risk averse and EU maximizers although this is
perfectly explained by the joint assumption that criminals are EU individuals
exhibiting a risk seeking behavior, as shown long ago by Becker (1968, p 178
footnote 19). For Neilson and Winter (1997), assuming risk seeking for crim-
inals would make criminals different from the rest of the population. But as
previously reminded, risk seeking is consistent with a large body of experimen-
tal evidence. Moreover, offenders who willingly undertake risks in some way
look like individuals making violent sports, having dangerous hobbies and so
on, who have been studied by sociologists (see the literature on society at risk :
Beck (1992), Giddens (1991)), and who are seen as risk loving populations. Nev-
ertheless in order to overcome what appears an uncomfortable consequence of
the EU model, Neilson and Winter (1997) have argued that if criminals are ei-
ther State-Dependent Utility (SDU) maximizers or Rank-Dependent Expected
Utility (RDEU) maximizers, then they may be risk averse and at the same time
display more sensitivity to shifts in the probability of fine than to changes in
the fine as found by Block and Gerety (1995) and Grogger (1991). Once more,
the relevance of the EU approach is challenged.
The purpose of the paper is to revisit the results of Neilson and Winter on
2According to the Arrow-Pratt’s definition, an individual is said to be risk averse if he
prefers the mean of a prospect with certainty to the prospect itself.
3According to Rothschild-Stiglitz’s definition, an individual is said to be risk averse if
between two loteries with the same mean but ranked according to the Second Stochastic
order, he prefers the one which is the less risky.
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two grounds. On the one hand, we distinguish between risk aversion in the
strong and in the weak sense. Secondly, we explicit several conditions that
are required in the SDU model to qualify their results. Finally, we discuss the
relevance and consequence of these conditions in the area of the economics of
crime.
3 Strongly risk averse criminals: an impossibil-
ity result
We consider the following notations: y > 0 will correspond to the (non random)
benefit obtained by the criminal in the illegal activity, and X = (p,−f ; 1− p, 0)
will be the prospect he faces due to the risk of public detection, arrestation and
punishment, where f > 0 is the monetary penalty (fine), and p the probability
of detection and sanction.
For the moment, we do not focus on a specific representation of the criminal’s
preferences. Let us simply assume that the preferences of the criminal satisfy
the usual axioms (existence, continuity, monotonicity and convergence in the
sense of the first stochastic dominance order). Let us denote by V the value
function representing criminals’ preferences, with V (y +X) being their welfare
associated to y and X. Let us finally assume for ease of exposition that V is
differentiable with respect to p and f . In this set up, two different concepts of
risk aversion may be defined:
- risk aversion in the strong sense of Rothschild-Stiglitz - which is risk
aversion to any shift in the risk X defined in the sense of the second sto-
chastic dominance order. In order to illustrate, assume that the prospect
X ′ = (p′,−f ′; 1 − p′, 0) with p′f ′ = pf is less risky than X in the sense of the
second stochastic order; thus, it must be that p′ > p and f ′ < f . As a result, if
V satisfies the second stochastic dominance order, then V (y+X ′) ≥ V (y+X).
- risk aversion in the weak sense of Arrow-Pratt - that is being better off with
the expected outcome of the prospect E(X) rather than accepting the prospect
X. Hence, risk aversion in the weak sense is written V (y+X) ≤ V (y+E(X)).
In order to see how criminals’ risk attitudes and the issue of their sensitivity
to relative shifts in fines and the certainty of punishment are interrelated, let us
consider the first definition of risk aversion. Basically, a simple mean-preserving
contraction of the risk X can be generated by an increase in the probability of
sanction p and a simultaneous decrease in the level of sanction f , while keeping
the expected sanction unchanged to pf . Thus, assume that the mean-preserving
contraction of the risk is obtained through a marginal change of p and f ; as the
probability increases, the fine must be set such that: df
dp
= − f
p
; moreover if V
satisfies the second stochastic dominance order, then when the criminal faces
this contraction of risk, his satisfaction level must increase with p such that dV
dp
=
Vp − Vf
f
p
≥ 0. Rearranging this inequality yields: −Vp
p
V
≡ eVp ≤ e
V
f ≡ −Vf
f
V
,
meaning that he must be less sensitive to the shift in the probability of sanction
than to the change in the level of the sanction. Hence a contradiction with the
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empirical findings by Block and Gerety (1995) and Grogger (1991). It is worth
noticing that whatever the assumption about the specific representation of the
criminal’s preferences, that is whether he is supposed to be an Expected utility
or a State-Dependent Utility one, a Rank Dependent Utility individual or using
any other model allowing the representation of his preferences, the same result
will occur: risk aversion in the strong sense is not consistent with the condition
eVp ≥ e
V
f .
However, remark that risk seeking in the strong sense (dV
dp
≤ 0) is always
consistent with eVp ≥ e
V
f .
In contrast, risk aversion in the weak sense may be consistent with eVp ≥ e
V
f .
But without any additional restrictions on the representation of preferences, it
is not easy to see when it occurs. In the following section, we focus on the
SDU model. In the EU model, risk aversion in the weak sense is equivalent
to risk aversion in the strong sense (see also Cohen (1995)). Hence, this de-
finitively rules out the EU model as a relevant assumption regarding criminals’
preferences.
The following proposition summarizes the results:
Proposition 1 For any representation of criminals’ preferences:
i) if they respect the second stochastic dominance order axiom, which implies
risk aversion in the strong sense of Rothschild-Stiglitz, then it is not possible to
support the empirical findings by Block and Gerety (1995) and Grogger (1991)
that eVp ≥ e
V
f .
ii) in contrast, the empirical findings by Block and Gerety (1995) and Grogger
(1991) that eVp ≥ e
V
f are always consistent with the assumption that criminals
are prone to a risk seeking behavior (in the strong sense of Rothschild-Stiglitz).
4 State-Dependent Utility maximizers
Assume that the preferences of a criminal satisfy the axioms of the SDU model.
Then, there exist two real value functions (both being continuous, increasing
and unique up to an affine transformation), denoted uc, un corresponding to
his utility indexes when he is respectively caught and not caught by public
authorities, such that when he earns y and faces the risk X = (p,−f ; 1− p, 0),
the criminal’s ex ante satisfaction level is noted:
V (y +X) = puc(y − f) + (1− p)un(y)
It is assumed that uc < un at all levels of wealth. The state-dependent rep-
resentation of individual preferences encompasses cases where the state of the
world affects the ability of an individual to enjoy consumption of his wealth;
for example, arrestation and/or conviction of a crime with incarceration may
easily be understood as states of the world where the opportunities to consume
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are diminished for criminals. This may also reflect that the criminal’s ability to
find a new job is reduced with a criminal record, or after prison (Nielson and
Winter (1997)). Even without a prison sentence, an individual who has been
only suspected of a crime may experience adverse effects on his consumption
opportunities through his human wealth because of reputational effects. On
the other hand, the state-dependent representation may capture psychological
or emotional consequences of arrestation and punishment, together with the
impact on the criminal’s health status in case of punishment.
In this framework, risk aversion in the weak sense of Arrow-Pratt requires
that both utility indexes be concave (Dehez and Drèze (1987), Jones-Lee (1974)).
According to the findings that eVp = p
un(y)−uc(y−f)
V (y+X) ≥ e
V
f = pf
u′
c
(y−f)
V (y+X) , for
the SDU model we must have:
un(y)− uc(y − f)
f
≥ u′c(y − f) (1)
We now prove that this inequality is always satisfied if u′c ≤ u
′
n at all levels
of wealth. Simple calculations show that (1) may be equivalently written as:
un(y)− un(y − f)
f
≥ −
un(y − f)− uc(y − f)
f
+ u′c(y − f)
But by the concavity of un, we have:
u′n(y − f) ≥
un(y)− un(y − f)
f
As a conclusion, risk aversion in the weak sense is compatible with the finding
that eVp ≥ e
V
f in the SDU model if it is also compatible with the following
inequality:
u′n(y − f) ≥ −
un(y − f)− uc(y − f)
f
+ u′c(y − f) (2)
Given that uc < un at all levels of wealth, (2) is always satisfied if we also
require that u′c ≤ u
′
n at all levels of wealth - which seems to be an implicit
assumption in the analysis of Neilson and Winter (1997, fig. 2 page 100) - but
it is incomplete or false otherwise as a general result.
Hence, in contrast to the claim made in Neilson (1998), the SDU does not
rule out the discussion about the implications of punishment on the marginal
utility of wealth. The assumption that u′c ≤ u
′
n at all levels of wealth means
that the criminal is better off earning one additional euro in the state where he
is free than earning the same euro when he is caught.
The discussion is summarized in the next proposition:
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Proposition 2 Assume that criminals’ preferences respect the SDU axioms,
with two utility indexes uc, un corresponding respectively to the state of ar-
restation and punishment, and the one without arrestation, both supposed to be
increasing and concave and satisfying: uc < un at all feasible levels of wealth;
then if u′c ≤ u
′
n at all levels of wealth, risk aversion in the weak sense of Arrow-
Pratt allows to support the empirical findings by Block and Gerety (1995) and
Grogger (1991) that eVp ≥ e
V
f .
In many areas of economics the assumption that u′c ≤ u
′
n at all levels of
wealth has been meaningful and useful; see for example the literature about the
existence of irreplaceable commodities (see Cook and Graham (1977)) or about
self-protection expenditures and the willingness to pay for safety, health and life
(see Dehez and Drèze (1987), Jones-Lee (1974) for example)4 .
Is it also relevant for the analysis of dangerous or criminal behaviors? We
may expect that it depends on what the state-dependent approach is supposed
to capture - and specifically on what the bad state represents. To the extent
that the state with arrestation and punishment is a state where the criminal
may bear not only a monetary penalty but also non monetary sanctions such
as imprisonment or incapacitations, it is not so obvious that one euro has more
value in the good state as compared to the bad state. Given that imprisonment
means a loss of income and thus a loss of consumption, the marginal utility of
wealth may be larger when the criminal is in jail than when he is not. Similarly,
incapacitations such as the loss of driving license or professional licences impose
the burden of substantial costs (fixed transportation costs, switching costs to
other activities and so on) on the individual who is punished in order to com-
pensate for the loss of those rights, which lead to a large increase in his marginal
utility in the state of arrestation and punishment. It implies that finally the
assumption u′c ≥ u
′
n is not absurd. As a result, (2) may not be obtained in such
situations.
On the contrary, the case where the bad state corresponds to the pain of
death better fits the situation where marginal utility is larger in the safe state
than in the bad one (as the result of a “dead anywhere effect”), explaining that
(2) always occurs.
Finally, remark that under the assumptions that both utility functions are
convex and satisfy uc < un at all levels of wealth, (1) is always satisfied without
the need of additional conditions.
5 Concluding remarks
It is not sufficient to remove the EU assumption in order to reconcile the risk
aversion assumption for criminals with the experimental evidence showing that
they have more sensitivity to the probability of being caught than to fines. In
4 It implies for example that prevention activities and/or the willingness to pay for a re-
duction in the risk of mortality are not inferior goods.
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this note, we have shown that the concept of risk aversion in the strong sense is
definitively ruled out, and that with risk aversion in the weak sense, additional
assumptions (specific to the each peculiar representation of preferences) are
required to fit these observations. Nevertheless, we have shown with examples
based on two well known alternatives to the EU assumption that these additional
conditions may have some shortcomings.
With the SDU approach, the issue is the meaning of the non monetary
aspects of punishment in the bad state (prison and incapacitations, or pain of
death) which governs the marginal utility in the bad state. Such an additional
assumption is questionable both from a descriptive or from an empirical point of
view. On the other hand, it is worth recalling that the risk seeking assumption
(in the strong sense) is always consistent with more sensitivity to frequency than
to severity of sanctions, whatever the representation of criminals preferences.
Casual observations about criminals’ behavior, e.g. committing an illegal act
or an offence, possibly with violence (homicide, murder), seem to reveal that
the criminals willingly undertake a risky and dangerous activity both for other
people and for themselves (although there exists also a risk of being caught
and punished) - thus, they are prone to a risk seeking attitude. Moreover, for
offences such as non compliance to speed limits or driving under the influence of
alcohol or drugs, the offender willingly exposes himself to a risk of accident and
personal injury; in the same spirit, for thefts or murders, the offender runs the
risk that the victims undertake selfdefensive activities that result in personal
injury for the criminal. But textbooks in economics of uncertainty teach that
risk averse people also undertake risky activities. From the modeler’s point
of view, it is worth pointing out that criminals’ risk attitude (risk aversion
versus risk seeking) may be endogenously determined, as a result of the choice
of instruments in law enforcement policies (probability of arrestation, monetary
fines, non monetary sanctions).
There are several implications regarding the literature on L&E. First, there
is a lack of direct and robust evidence on the issue of criminals’ risk attitude:
indirect observations such as those revealed by Block and Gerety (1995) or Grog-
ger (1991) are not tests of the hypothesis of risk seeking versus the risk aversion
one for criminals. These studies simply definitively rule out the risk neutrality
assumption and the strong risk aversion one. Second, the existing experiments
do not consider the existence of non monetary sanctions. Our claim is that
the monetary equivalent of non pecuniary sanctions (such as imprisonment, in-
capacitation and so on) is not a perfect substitute to the monetary wealth of
the criminals. This reflects that the marginal utility of wealth in the state with
arrestation is not the same as the marginal utility in the state of freedom. Thus,
whether criminals and offenders are more sensitive to the probability of arresta-
tion than to the level of fines may be contingent to the presence (and the choice
in term of level or intensity) of some non monetary sanctions in case of arresta-
tion and punishment. Hence additional experiments including both monetary
and non monetary sanctions are required in order to challenge the robustness
of the findings by Block and Gerety (1995) or Grogger (1991).
Finally, the results of these complementary studies will be important for
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the economics of crime, since they focuse on some aspects which have been
previously neglected for example in the literature about law enforcement poli-
cies. Polinsky and Shavell (1979) show that criminals’ risk aversion may well
explain why less than maximal fines may be socially worth contradicting the
classical result obtained by Becker (1968) for risk neutral criminals. But Niel-
son (1998) has shown that when criminals display state dependent risk aversion
and are more sensitive to probability than to fines, Becker’s result still holds,
e.g. maximal fines are always optimal, thus suggesting that risk aversion does
not matter to explain the findings of Block and Gerety (1995) and Grogger
(1991). On the other hand, it is also well known since Polinsky and Shavell
(1984) that it is generally not optimal to supplement fines with imprisonment
unless the maximal possible fines (and the marginal cost of imprisonment) are
low enough, strengthening the beckerian view. The point is that the analysis
of non monetary sanctions assumes that the monetary equivalent of the pain
of imprisonment or any other non monetary sanction is a perfect substitute to
the criminals’ wealth. In contrast, assuming the imperfect substitutability be-
tween wealth and the monetary equivalent of the pain of imprisonment (as it
holds when the criminals’ marginal utility of wealth is smaller in the state of
imprisonment than in the state without imprisonment) implies that non mon-
etary sanctions have indirect costs in utility terms for criminals, such that in
the state of arrestation they face a specific trade-off between the fines and the
non monetary sanction which also affects the trade-off probability/fines. Thus
putting pieces together, it is easy to understand the consequences for the design
of optimal law enforcement policies. Assume for example that criminals display
state dependent risk aversion and are more sensitive to fines than to probabil-
ity, because the use of a non monetary sanction in case of arrestation entails
for criminals a marginal utility of wealth larger than in the state of freedom.
Then it may become socially optimal to use non monetary sanctions and to set a
probability as large as possible before that fines reach their maximal level. This
challenges Nielson’s (1998) and Becker’s (1968) results. Once more, empirical
and experimental studies would be useful in order to establish which view is the
more likely.
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